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Abstract: Norman presents intriguing arguments in support of a mapping
between ecological and constructivist visual cognition, on the one hand,
onto the dorsal ventral dual route processing hypothesis, on the other
hand. Unfortunately, his account is incompatible with developmental data
on the functional emergence of the dorsal and ventral routes. We argue
that it is essential for theories of adult visual cognition to take constraints
from development seriously.
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Norman reviews an impressive amount of evidence in support of
his claim that dual route visual processing reflects the distinction
between constructivist and ecological approaches to visual cogni-
tion. Unfortunately, while he makes a convincing case, he fails to
address an important part of the literature: the developmental lit-
erature. Although from the onset Norman declares that a true de-
velopmental approach is beyond the scope of the target article, his
proposal rests on the assumption that the dorsal route functions
are innate or largely mature very early in infancy, whereas the ven-
tral constructivist functions are largely developed later in life.
Norman cites a paragraph from Kellman and Artberry (1998) in
support of this claim (see target article, sect. 5.2.1).
However, a wide range of behavioural and electrophysiological
data does not support this assumption. The dual route visual pro-
cessing paradigm is playing an increasingly important role in the
study of infant perceptual and cognitive development (e.g., Atkin-
son 1998; Berthental 1996; Mareschal et al. 1999). One of the
questions raised in developmental circles is whether the dorsal or
the ventral route functions develop first during infancy. The gen-
eral conclusion to this question is that if there are differences be-
tween the developmental rates of the ventral and dorsal routes,
then the dorsal route is likely to be developmentally delayed with
respect to the ventral route (e.g., Atkinson 2000).
We list here just a few pieces of evidence in support of this claim
(a full review can be found in Johnson et al. 2001). Studies mea-
suring Evoked Response Potentials (ERPs) to face images indi-
cate that the ventral pathway can be activated at 6 months (albeit
with some further specialization to take place; De Hann et al., in
press). In contrast, ERP evidence suggests the dorsal pathway is
still not influencing eye movement control at that age (Csibra et
al. 1998). This ERP evidence is interpreted as suggesting that at
least this aspect of dorsal pathway function is somewhat slower to
develop than the ventral pathway. Other evidence arises from be-
havioural infant studies. While babies show sophisticated facial
discrimination abilities (a canonically ventral function) from a very
early age (De Hann & Halit 2001), body-centred spatial repre-
sentations that guide eye movements develop gradually over the
first year of life (Gilmore & Johnson 1997).
Within the context of this commentary we wish to remain ag-
nostic with regards to (i) whether the two routes do actually de-
velop at different rates, or (ii) whether they both develop at com-
parable rates during infancy. The important point is that neither
of these interpretations of the data are inconsistent with Norman’s
proposals.
So, where does this leave us with regard to Norman’s hypothe-
sis? We do not have a problem with the mapping that Norman is
trying to make between the dorsal/ventral dual route hypothesis
and the ecological/constructivist debate in perception. In fact, we
are generally sympathetic to many of his arguments. What we do
wish to do, however, is to argue that any theoretical account of per-
ception and cognition must take developmental constraints seri-
ously (this was well understood by Gibson 1969). It is no use com-
ing up with a theory of adult performance that is incommensurate
with developmental evidence. Otherwise, one is stuck with the un-
welcome task of explaining how one behavioural system is magi-
cally transformed into another at an unspecified point in develop-
ment.
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